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I. Introduction
{1} The Fifth Amendment commands that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."[1] However, extending current judicial interpretations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
too far may allow the government easy access even to private documents, making one's diary and other
documents accessible and admissible in court against their author.
{2} What the Court has taken away, technology has given. Modern cryptography can make it virtually
impossible to decipher documents without the cryptographic key,[2] thus making the availability of the
contents of those documents depend on the availability of the key. This article examines the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments' protection against the compulsory production of the key and the scope of the Fifth Amendment
immunity against compelled production. After analyzing these questions using prevailing Fourth and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, I shall describe the advantages of a privacy-based approach in practical and
constitutional terms.

II. The Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Production of
Cryptographic Keys
A. Accessibility of Documents Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
{3} The Fourth Amendment provides little protection from the search and seizure of documents. In Warden v.
Hayden,[3] the Court discarded the rule that the power to search and seize depended on the assertion of a
superior right to the property seized. Before Warden, officers could search for fruits of a crime, because a
superior right was in the property owners; for contraband, because no one could legally own contraband; and
for instrumentalities, because their role in the commission of the crime made them forfeitable; but could not
search for mere evidence.[4] Because, for example, diaries are "mere evidence," the Warden rule potentially
could allow search warrants to seize diaries and other purely private documents. Although Warden expressly
refused to consider "whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being
the object of a reasonable search and seizure,"[5] many now believe that all objects can be seized.[6]
{4} The Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self incrimination also provides little protection for existing
documents. The Court generally interprets the Fifth Amendment to allow the government to compel the
production of these documents, because the government did not compel anyone to write the documents.[7]
Thus, the government can compel the production of documents and, if written, the key encrypting the
documents. Although there may still be some protection for private documents, such protection is uncertain
in its existence and narrow in its scope.[8]

{5} Under the Warden view and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, written cryptographic keys cannot be
distinguished from the documents themselves. If the key is found by a search, it can be used. If one can
subpoena the underlying documents, one can subpoena the key.
{6} In this section, I shall assume the correctness of Justice O'Connor's belief that there is now no Fourth or
Fifth Amendment obstacle to the compulsory production of existing documents, whether text, encrypted text,
or cryptographic key.[9] This means that the basis of protection must be an assertion of Fifth Amendment
privilege against a question asking one to disclose a memorized cryptographic key.

B. Fifth Amendment Testimoniality and the Production of a Memorized
Cryptographic Key
{7} Because current law may hold that the underlying, pre-existing documents can be the subject of a search
or subpoena, Fifth Amendment analysis must focus on the disclosure of the cryptographic key on the
assumption that the key is not written down. The Fifth Amendment is now interpreted to bar only the
production of "testimonial information,"[10] so the protection of the Fifth Amendment extends only to an
incriminating communication that might "itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information."[11]
{8} A non-cryptographic key is physical evidence, not testimonial evidence.[12] Thus, the Court has upheld
both a Fourth Amendment seizure[13] and the compulsory production of such non-testimonial evidence, such
as a blood sample[14] or the performance of sobriety tests that do not involve communication.[15]
{9} A cryptographic key need not have testimonial content. A key can be any word, phrase, or a series of
randomly chosen digits. However, one can imagine a cryptographic key that has been given an incriminating,
testimonial content by making it a word or phrase that confesses to a crime. Many seldom-enforced
statutes[16] enable one to confess to a crime in one's cryptographic key, thereby triggering potential criminal
liability and therefore the protection of the Fifth Amendment,[17] without incurring much risk of prosecution
or of social obloquy should the key leak or the Fifth Amendment argument be rejected. However, many keys
will not confess to a crime. So, while this may be a factor for the prudent in selecting particular cryptographic
keys, it cannot be relied upon to resolve the problems before the courts.[18]
{10} Because a cryptographic key need not be testimonial and will ordinarily not be testimonial, it might be
argued that the disclosure of the key could be compelled without raising Fifth Amendment issues. Why
should a cryptographic key be protected from production if a non-cryptographic key such as the key to a safe,
is not?[19]
{11} The difficulty in distinguishing the two cases is exacerbated by the ability of circumstances to cause the
same information to be expressed in testimonial and non-testimonial ways. For example, producing a key to a
safe implicitly asserts that the key I turn over is the key to the safe and implicitly admits my control over the
key. These implicit admissions cannot be used against the producer of the key. However, the key itself will
not be suppressed. One could easily consider the production of the key an implicit description of the shape of
the key, perhaps in a standardized form common to locksmiths, in which case I have made a testimonial
assertion about the key and the relation of the key so described to the safe that the key opened.
{12} Despite the functional identity between these keys, the Court has already suggested in dictum that there
is a fine line that distinguishes testimonial from non-testimonial compulsion. In Doe v. United States (Doe II),
the Court recognized that "be[ing] compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe" would be testimonial
compulsion, but suggested that the key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents would not be.[20]
{13} The Court's conclusion in Doe II appears to be consistent with its other cases. The argument that the

Fifth Amendment allows the compulsory disclosure of a combination confuses the requirement that the
statement be testimonial with the argument that the Fifth Amendment requires that the thing about which the
statement is made be testimonial. Although the key has no testimonial content, a statement concerning the
key is testimonial. The same would be true of a murder weapon. The murder weapon itself is not testimonial,
but the suspect's statement about the location of the murder weapon would be testimonial. So, too, would the
disclosure of the key associated with particular encrypted documents be testimonial. Thus, if a customdesigned chip included the key in hardware or firmware, the production of the chip could be compelled, just
as physical evidence or a pre-existing document could be compelled.
{14} The difficulties with the boundary line the Court has drawn between testimonial and non-testimonial
information are not unique to cryptographic keys. For example, although evidence about someone's physical
state is not considered testimonial information, the use of heart rate and skin resistance as part of a polygraph
test might well be considered testimonial. "[E]ven a subject unwilling throughout would presumably provide
revealing lie-detector responses if bombarded by words meaningful in the context of the crime being
investigated-'hammer!' 'club!' 'wrench!' 'pipe!'"[21] The Supreme Court suggested in Schmerber that the
results of such a test would be inadmissible:
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," for example, lie detector tests
measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting
responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing in which an
effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses,
whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such situations
call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege "is as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard."[22]
{15} Conversely, testimonial information sought not for the truth of the information, but to reveal an
underlying physical state, is inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Muniz[23] involved a
videotape of someone who had been arrested for drunk driving. At one point, the defendant's interrogator
asked him when his sixth birthday was.[24] The questioner was not interested in the actual date of the
birthday, but in "the incriminating inference of impaired mental faculties . . . from a testimonial aspect of that
response."[25] Although the inquisitor was not interested in obtaining a truthful answer, the Supreme Court
held that the question implicated the Fifth Amendment.[26]
{16} These boundary lines cannot easily be extended to make disclosure of cryptographic keys nontestimonial. Ambiguities could be used to extend the Fifth Amendment to the production of implicitly
testimonial conduct, such as the production of safe keys. However, to hold that an expressly assertive
statement was non-testimonial would effectively eliminate the Fifth Amendment's protection against selfincrimination. A cryptographic key can be likened to testimonial statements. Consequently, it seems safe to
conclude that the compulsory production of a cryptographic key implicates the Fifth Amendment.

C. The Scope of Immunity from the Compelled Production of the Key
{17} If, as the above argument suggests, the identification of the key is testimonial, the critical issue will be
the extent of the immunity necessary to satisfy the Fifth Amendment's proscription of self-incrimination.[27]
The federal government has suggested that it will seek to grant immunity as a tool for discovering encrypted
documents.[28] Does immunity extend only to the key or does it also cover the decrypted document produced
by applying the key to the encrypted text?

1. Derivative Use Immunity for Documents Produced with a Cryptographic Key

{18} The Supreme Court has distinguished between incriminating documents, which may not be protected by
the privilege, and the incriminating aspects of producing the documents, from which one may claim Fifth
Amendment immunity even if the documents themselves are uncovered.[29] Thus, in United States v. Doe
(Doe I), the Court held that the production of individual tax records in the individual's possession might have
testimonial and self-incriminating aspects such that their production could only be required through a grant of
use immunity.[30] Although it has been suggested that derivative immunity for encrypted documents would
follow as a matter of course from the production of the key,[31] this line of cases suggests otherwise.
{19} The leading authority here is Justice White's opinion for the Court in Fisher, which discusses the
testimonial aspects of production as though the courts could compel production so long as the amount of selfincrimination is not excessive.[32] The same sort of reasoning appears in other cases, even when those cases
have resolved this analysis in favor of the individual. For example, in Doe I, the Court upheld a refusal to
comply with a subpoena absent a grant of immunity because the incriminating effects of production were not
"trivial."[33] Doe I distinguished Fisher as a case where "the act of production would have only minimal
testimonial value and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer."[34]
{20} Fisher did not address the issue of derivative use immunity where the government would not have
found the documents without a subpoena. This is because Fisher involved a situation in which the
government could certainly get the documents without the aid of the subpoena. "The existence and location
of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the papers."[35] Because the government did not
need the subpoena to get the papers, it had sufficiently shown an independent route to the papers to make
them admissible without violation of the Fifth Amendment.
{21} It is not certain that the Court still follows this narrow view of Fisher. In Braswell v. United States, a
case following Fisher, the dissent argued without opposition from the majority that documents produced
pursuant to a claim of privilege could nonetheless be used against the producer, so long as the testimonial
effect of the production itself was shielded.[36]
{22} On the other hand, the Court has not held that documents compulsorily produced can automatically be
used against the producer. Fisher does discuss the actual effect of production; the facts of the case, in which
the papers were initially in the hands of the accountant, support the Court's conclusion that the production of
the papers did not increase the government's information. Nothing in Fisher, then, can be interpreted to mean
that the Fifth Amendment allows the derivative use of documents which the government could not
independently find and authenticate.[37] Doe I, subsequent to Fisher, held that the documents in question
need not have been produced,[38] and in the absence of a request for use immunity, the Court did not deal
with the issue of derivative use immunity.[39] Doe II, also subsequent to Fisher, involved the compulsory
signing of a directive to foreign banks without admitting any information.[40] Because the Court held that
this did not implicate the Fifth Amendment, that case also did not involve any issue of derivative use
immunity. In Braswell the underlying documents were corporate records and therefore not privileged,[41] so
derivative use immunity could not apply.
{23} If the broad reading of Fisher is correct, the presumable basis for Fisher's apparent conclusion is that
the documents themselves do not implicate the Fifth Amendment because they were not produced under
compulsion. This, of course, makes perfect sense with regard to the documents considered as original objects
of discovery under a search and seizure permitted by the Fourth Amendment.
{24} However, it neglects the Court's usual requirement that immunity extend to the derivative use of any
compelled information. The leading case, Kastigar v. United States, establishes the general rule that the grant
of immunity must include "derivative use immunity": immunity from "any use, direct or indirect, of the
compelled testimony and any information derived therefrom . . . ."[42] Kastigar "prohibits the prosecutorial

authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect."[43] The burden is on the prosecution, which
has "the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source
wholly independent of the compelled testimony."[44] Thus, use immunity expressly prohibits using
testimony "as an 'investigatory lead'" or using "any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness
as a result of his compelled disclosures."[45]
{25} In the absence of derivative use immunity, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
places an individual compelled to produce evidence in a better position than receiving immunity. Kastigar
relied on the Court's prior decision on state-compelled testimony, holding that "immunity from use and
derivative use 'leaves the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a grant of immunity."[46] If the information would not
have been discovered without the grant of immunity, the witness is placed in a worse position because of the
grant of immunity.[47]
{26} In its cases involving the production of documents, the Court seems to have confused the issue of
whether the documents are necessarily privileged with the question of whether they are the product of
compelled testimonial conduct. The Court was arguably correct in its conclusion that they are not privileged
because their writing was not compelled. Thus, one can conclude that if the documents had been seized as a
result of a legitimate search, they would be admissible. However, the Court ignored the question of whether
they were the product of compelled information. If the prosecution immunizes a defendant and asks her
where the murder weapon is, and the prosecution uses that information to obtain the weapon, it will be barred
from using the weapon to trace the defendant to the crime unless it can show an independent path. Indeed, the
Court has recently re-affirmed its statement in Curcio v. United States[48] that the custodian of documents
cannot be compelled to answer questions about the documents' location without a grant of use immunity.[49]
Under the Court's precedents, such a grant implies that documents discovered or produced as a result of the
answers to such questions would be suppressed as the product of the compelled testimony.[50] A subpoena to
produce the documents implicitly requires the same information as would result from the answering of
questions about the documents' location, so a distinction in the scope of derivative immunity in the two cases
seems unjustified. Indeed, the Court's earlier cases expressly equate documents discovered by compulsory
production and documents discovered by compulsory testimony, which then leads to the documents:
In practice the result is the same to one accused of a crime, whether he be obliged to supply
evidence against himself or whether such evidence be obtained by an illegal search of his
premises and seizure of his private papers. In either case he is the unwilling source of the
evidence, and the Fifth Amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal case.[51]
{27} In Fisher and progeny, the defendant failed sufficiently to exclude the possibility of independent
discovery. So far as holdings go, as opposed to statements, there is nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions
from Fisher to the present that excludes the possibility of its rejecting its ill-conceived and inconsistent
assumptions on derivative use immunity in the case of documents. Even the statements are rare, being
confined to a dissenter's assertion in Braswell.[52]
{28} Thus, it is still open for the Court to conclude that its conventional doctrines of use immunity apply to
documentary production. In the context of cryptographic keys, that would ensure that the compulsory
production of the key provided derivative use immunity for the contents of the documents decrypted with the
key.

2. Immunity As a Result of the Special Properties of Cryptographic Keys
{29} Even if the Court concludes that derivative use immunity does not generally apply to documents

discovered with the aid of compelled testimony, there are special reasons for extending Fifth Amendment
immunity to documents decrypted with the aid of the compelled production of a cryptographic key.

a. Creation of Communicative Content Through Decryption
{30} One unique property of a cryptographic key is that it creates communicative content. Producing an
ordinary document or making available a key to a safe does not alter the communicative content of the
documents produced or made available. In contrast, producing a cryptographic key gives the document a
testimonial content by decrypting the document and returning it into plaintext. Thus, the compulsory
production of the key is the compulsory creation of testimonial content. Without the key, the documents
would not be useful as testimony.[53]
{31} Several Supreme Court opinions suggest that the creation of documentary evidence in this fashion
triggers Fifth Amendment protection. The Court has held that the protection of the Fifth Amendment extends
to any incriminating communication that might "itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information."[54] The production of a cryptographic key indirectly relates the material contained in
the document decrypted with the cryptographic key and should therefore lead to immunity under the Fifth
Amendment for the document produced with the key.
{32} Elsewhere, the Court has stated that it "do[es] not view the exhibition of physical characteristics to be
equivalent to the creation of documentary evidence."[55] The Court's concern with "the creation of
documentary evidence" also suggests that the compulsory production of the cryptographic key, which makes
possible the creation of the documentary evidence to be used in court, provides immunity as to the documents
that could be created only with the key.
{33}Finally, Fisher and Doe I stated that the production sought in those cases "does not . . . ordinarily compel
the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought."[56] Thus,
although a person may be compelled to produce a document, compulsory production cannot require her to
repeat, affirm, or explain the contents of the document. However, the compulsory production of the key does
force the repetition of the document in a new and courtroom-usable form. Under these precedents, then, the
compulsory production of a key should give rise to immunity from culpability derived from the document
produced with the key.
{34} Even if it were argued that it is the document and the key that jointly create the testimonial content, that
is sufficient, because self-incrimination protection extends to all the "links [that] frequently compose that
chain of testimony which is necessary to convict any individual of a crime."[57] Thus, an ordinarily nonprivileged item, such as the identity of the client or fee information, is privileged if the disclosure of the item
would reveal the substance of an attorney-client communication.[58] Because the key is a necessary link in
the chain, it gives rise to immunity from documents with it.

b. Authentication Through Decryption
{35} A second unique property of a cryptographic key is that it can operate as a digital signature, necessarily
authenticating a document.[59] Indeed, if the person providing the information has never shared that
information with anyone else, a cryptographic key provides a more effective way of authenticating than
locks, because it is easier to pick locks than to decrypt without a key.[60]
{36} The Fifth Amendment precludes the compulsory authentication of documents. "[T]he Fifth Amendment
may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his
possession because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating

information."[61] "'[T]he constitutional privilege against self incrimination . . . is designed to prevent the use
of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to
force him to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him.'"[62]
{37} The Court noted that where the compulsory production of documents may authenticate them,
"reliev[ing] the government of the need for authentication," the Fifth Amendment precludes their production.
[63] Although Fisher suggested that no grant of immunity is necessary where the "possession [of the
documents, their] existence, and authentication were a 'foregone conclusion,'"[64] these issues will seldom be
indisputable with respect to cryptographic keys. One difference between "a pre-existing document and a preexisting object" is that a prosecutor "can usually authenticate [a document, such as a diary,] as the defendant's
either by content or handwriting analysis."[65] Authentication in this way will be impossible without the key.
The impossibility of such authentication suggests that the factual premise of Fisher cannot apply in the case
of computer-encrypted documents, so that compulsory production of a cryptographic key requires granting
use immunity for the documents decrypted with the key.

3. Conclusion
{38} Close analysis of cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment suggests that the amendment does provide
protection against the compulsory production of cryptographic keys. This protection can result from a
reconciliation of the Court's inconsistency between the compulsory production of documentary evidence and
its more general treatment of the doctrine of derivative use immunity. Even in the absence of such a
reconciliation, the Court's precedents suggest that it can be expected to hold that the documents produced
from a cryptographic key cannot be used against the producer of the key, because a cryptographic key
authenticates and confers testimonial content on documents that are otherwise unauthenticated and
meaningless.
{39} This result is quite narrow: only those who claim to be criminally incriminated by the key or the
decrypted document can claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Although I have suggested a way in
which overbroad criminal statutes can be turned to the advantage of innocent citizens,[66] this result seems
unsatisfactory. Why should criminals have a right to privacy in their documents when non-criminals do not?
The obvious answer is that the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination, not against invasions of
privacy. However, early American cases provided much broader protection for privacy. The next section
justifies a revival of these early authorities.

III. The Advantages of a Traditional Solution
{40} Although early cases provided immunity from search and seizure and the compulsory production of
most private documents, it is unclear whether any of this early protection for private documents survives.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the Doe II opinion expressed her belief that the Court's opinion eliminated
the possibility of protection for documents. It has been suggested that her opinion for the court in Baltimore
City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight[67] establishes her Doe II concurrence as the holding of the
Court.[68]
{41} On the other hand, Bouknight involved an attempt to conceal a child, which is quite a different case
from documents.[69] The absence of protection for corporate documents results from the state's power of
visitation over corporations, which meant that their records were not private.[70] The same argument would
apply with even greater force with a child, which could not be said to be the private property or records of a
parent. Moreover, even after the Court's decision in Baltimore v. Bouknight, the Court continues to say that
the privilege reflects "our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual 'to a private enclave where he may live a private life.'"[71] This idea of a private life is difficult to

reconcile with a privilege that applies solely to self-incriminating and testimonial conduct before a judicial
tribunal.
{42} This part of the paper suggests the outlines of an alternative approach to the problem of confidential
documents and justifies that approach in terms of the Constitution and its traditional interpretation. Even if
the United States Supreme Court refuses to entertain such an approach, state courts may be persuaded that
such an approach is both more consistent with the intent of the adopters of the Constitution and contemporary
considerations of policy.

A. Search and Seizure under Boyd v. United States
{43} In Boyd v. United States,[72] the Supreme Court held that "a search and seizure [was] equivalent [to] a
compulsory production of a man's private papers" and that the search was "an 'unreasonable search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."[73] Under Boyd, the government could not search for
private documents and could not compel their production.
{44} The Boyd decision was based on a careful review of the intent at the time of the framing and the
practices of the colonial governments to which the framers objected.[74] Historically, searches could only be
based on the superior property rights of the government or some other person in the things for which the
search was made.[75] Thus, one could search for and seize "stolen or forfeited goods"[76] and contraband,
such as "counterfeit coin, lottery, tickets, implements of gambling, & c."[77] "Forfeited goods" included the
instrumentalities of the crime, which were forfeited because of their use in the crime[78] and included papers
that were fruits, contraband, or instrumentalities.[79] Because mere evidence could not be searched for at the
time of the framing, and the framers intended to adopt these common-law restrictions,[80] these standards
defined what the framers would have understood as a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment.[81]
{45} Boyd likewise cited the work of the first congress and contemporary rules of equity in interpreting the
scope of the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination.[82] The Boyd opinion noted that even the
"obnoxious writs of assistance" did not allow searches for private papers.[83] As the Boyd Court further
observed, the same history showed an absence of power to use process to seize private papers,[84] and the
first Congress expressly adopted chancery practice, which forbade the compulsory production of documents.
[85] Congress did not enact a statute that could possibly be construed to allow the seizure of private papers,
whether for use in evidence or in forfeiture, until 1863.[86] The Boyd Court concluded from this review of
practices of the framing that the compulsory production of private papers or a search for them violated the
Fifth Amendment as well as the Fourth Amendment.[87]
{46} Boyd's antiquity suggests that it is consistent with the framers' intent. Indeed, both Boyd and the
subsequent Gouled decision expressly placed their analysis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments on a
historical basis.[88] Subsequent decisions, although criticizing these cases, have not attacked their historical
basis.[89]
{47} One possible difficulty with Boyd's argument is that the search and review of papers are themselves the
invasion of privacy. That papers that are mere evidence are not then carried away does not eliminate the harm
from the search. As Learned Hand wrote, "If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so much
difference what is taken away, since the officers will ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate,
and there can be no sound policy in protecting what does."[90] However, as Hand continued, "Nevertheless,
limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself."[91] In addition, the need for probable
cause for a search, coupled with restrictions on what the government may seize, could limit the occurrences
of searches of private papers.
{48} Although Boyd's property-oriented approach to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provides more

support for privacy than the contemporary privacy-based approach of Katz,[92] it would be wrong to
conclude that the Boyd rule would allow unrestricted criminality. Under the Boyd line of cases, there could be
no Fifth Amendment rights for corporate papers because of the state's visitatorial powers.[93] Under the postBoyd extension of corporate treatment to non-corporate collective entities, organizations such as partnerships,
unions, and bankrupt businesses would have no Fifth Amendment protection.[94] If this doctrine covers
associations in fact,[95] the scope of communications entitled to Fifth Amendment protection would present
few obstacles to law enforcement.
{49} Similarly, Boyd's principles allowed the Fourth Amendment seizure of papers sent to another in pursuit
of criminality as the instrumentalities of criminal acts.[96] As Justice Marshall observed in dissent, "I see no
bar in the Fourth or Fifth Amendment to the seizure of a letter from one conspirator to another directing the
recipient to take steps that further the conspiracy.[97]
{50} Boyd's definition of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights would also allow the granting of use immunity
to the recipient of a communication to compel the contents of that communication to be used against the
sender, or vice versa. An individual may not invoke the Fifth Amendment to protect against incrimination by
a third party.[98] Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, encrypted material that one sends to another can be
discovered by the government by giving the recipient use immunity for the production of the key, because the
Constitution "does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another."[99]

B. Implications of the Rejection of Boyd
1. Rejection of Precedents
{51} If the Court continues to reject Boyd, it will have to reject more than the Boyd case. The doctrine that
there was substantive protection of documents under the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment, and that
an invalid search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment precluded the use of the documents was shared in
many opinions, some unanimous and some by the Court's most eminent members. In United States v. Saline
Bank, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, rejected a request for the production of bank
documents.[100] "The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose
him to penalties, and this case falls within it."[101] Hale v. Henkel affirmed Boyd's holding that "an order for
the production of books and papers may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth
Amendment."[102] In Gouled v. United States,[103] Justice Clarke, speaking for a unanimous court, held
when a government agent seized documents in violation of the Fourth Amendment, their introduction into
court violated the Fifth Amendent.[104] The Court's Silverthorne Lumber opinion by Justice Holmes and
Justice Brandeis' famous Olmstead dissent are in accord.[105] Many other cases concur.[106]
{52} Boyd's statement has been approved as recently as 1973, when United States v. Dionisio[107] stated that
the grand jury "cannot require the production by a person of private books and records that would incriminate
him."[108] In 1976, even after the Fisher decision, the Court wrote in Andresen v. Maryland, "'[T]he
constitutional privilege against self incrimination . . . is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force
from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to force him to produce and
authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him.'"[109] Andresen, by stating that
the government's ability to use information depends on whether it had been produced by subpoena or search,
suggests that the government was unable to use subpoenaed documents against their producer.[110] This
result would not have followed from a legitimate search under the Fourth Amendment.[111]
{53} The erosion of constitutional protection for private documents proceeded in three ways. First, Warden v.
Hayden abolished the "mere evidence" rule.[112] Although Warden,[113] Fisher,[114] and other cases have
held out the possibility of protection for diaries, the general rule is that merely evidentiary documents can

now be seized without restriction.[115]
{54} Second, cases have narrowed the scope of evidence that was considered compelled, so that the
compelled production of documents was not considered the compulsion of the incriminating evidence in the
documents themselves. In Johnson v. United States, Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, "A party is
privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its production."[116] That phrase led to the idea, in
subsequent cases, that compelled production of incriminating information could make the information usable
against the person producing it, if that person were screened from the testimonial aspects of production.[117]
This interpretation is inapplicable to the facts of Johnson, which did not involve an attempt to make a party
produce evidence by granting that party limited immunity.[118]
{55} Third, the Court further limited the Fifth Amendment's protection to extend only to testimonial
evidence. The origin of this line of authority was cases such as Holmes' opinion in Holt v. United States,
which held that an accused could be compelled to wear a blouse like that worn by the perpetrator.[119] Holt,
however, did not distinguish between the act of producing information and the testimonial contents of what
was compulsorily produced. Rather, it held that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition only extended to "physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material."[120] Wearing the blouse was a physical act and not a commnuication. However, the threat
of contempt certainly coerces documentary evidence, which is a communication. Thus, Holt is entirely
consistent with Holmes' opinion for the Court in Silverthorne Lumber, which barred a subpoena for
documents.[121] Holt is also entirely consistent with opinions that Holmes joined such as Hale, affirming
Boyd's holding that "an order for the production of books and papers may constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure within the Fourth Amendment,"[122] and Gouled, holding that when a government agent seized
documents in violation of the Fourth Amendment, their introduction into court violated the Fifth Amendment.
[123]
{56} However, in Fisher v. United States, the Court stated that the compulsory production of business
documents did not compel testimonial self-incrimination, so it was not prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
[124] The Court reasoned that the author of the statements written in the documents was not compelled to be
a witness against himself, because the author had voluntarily written the statements. The Court did hold that
any inferences drawn from the act of production itself could be barred.[125] "The elements of compulsion are
clearly present, but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both
'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. These questions perhaps do
not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on the facts and
circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof."[126] In that case, the Court concluded that because the
papers had been prepared by the accountant and were in the hands of the accountant, their production did not
"involve testimonial self-incrimination."[127]

2. Inconsistencies with Other Authority on Privilege
{57} The expansion of other privileges protecting against intrusion into personal thoughts, including workproduct immunity, attorney-client and spousal privileges, and self-evaluative privileges, shows that there is
no compelling policy reason for rejecting Boyd.
{58) Work-product immunity had its origin as a special case of mental privacy, not as a special privilege for
attorneys. As the Court wrote in Hickman v. Taylor, which invented work-product protection, "[e]xamination
into a person's files and records, including those resulting from the professional activities of an attorney, must
be judged with care. It is not without reason that various safeguards have been established to preclude
unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's work."[128] If the doctrine of mental privacy is to be
rejected, then the foundation of Hickman and work-product protection is undermined.

{59} Commonly accepted testimonial privileges create at least as much social harm as and have fewer
benefits than Boyd's protection for private documents.[129] If I write down my daily activities in a letter to an
attorney or spouse, keeping a copy for myself, the material is privileged in the hands of the author, the
attorney, and the spouse.[130] Both the marital privilege and the Boyd privilege for private documents create
a zone of autonomy. "From the perspective of the individual in Western industrial societies, the marital
relationship is likely to be seen as an extension of one's personal autonomy . . . . It is in this sense that courts
often glimpse the relationship between the privilege against self-incrimination and the marital witness
privilege."[131]
{60} A diary privilege is even more justified than an attorney-client privilege. Because of the need for legal
advice, the attorney-client relationship is less likely to be deterred by a loss of privilege than diary keeping.
Moreover, the attorney-client privilege can be used to evade the law[132] or to convey information through a
corporation without creating a discoverable paper trail,[133] which weakens the claim for the privilege.
{61} Courts and legislatures have also been creating new privileges. The courts have judicially expanded
government privileges, even though the legislature can protect the government. "[G]overnment privileges
continue to metastasize."[134] Many jurisdictions have also protected corporate efforts at self-evaluation
under the rubric of "self-evaluative privileges." These include general self-evaluative privileges for hospital
peer review committees[135] and environmental audits,[136] and other authorities have suggested expanding
the privilege in other areas.[137]
{62} Thus, contemporary law generally provides a high degree of privilege for attorneys and those who
consult with them, a fair degree of privilege for governments and corporations evaluating themselves, and no
privilege at all for those who merely want to write down their ideas. Because the equivalent of the Boyd
privilege is available to those who have spouses or attorneys and the sophistication to use them in this way,
only the shy, the naive, or the single and impoverished need give up their right of privacy.

3. Privacy and Property Rights
{63} In addition to Boyd's consistency with the framers' intent and with other privileges created by a privacybased approach, its protection of property interests may protect privacy more effectively than tests directly
based on privacy.
{64} Warden v. Hayden,[138] in which the Supreme Court discerned a "shift in emphasis from property to
privacy"[139] in Fourth Amendment rights, significantly eroded protection against governmental searches
and seizures. In Warden v. Hayden, the Court upheld the seizure of mere evidence, although such a seizure
would not have been allowed under property-based interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. In Katz v.
United States,[140] the Supreme Court followed the Warden v. Hayden decision and so resolved the "search"
of a telephone conversation by saying that the search invaded privacy, rather than reaching the same result
through property law concepts.[141]
{65} This reconstruction of Fourth Amendment law to limit the influence of property law concepts was
unnecessary. Justices concurring in the result in Warden v. Hayden said so in their opinions.[142] Moreover,
Warden v. Hayden based the shift to privacy on the argument that common law concepts of property could not
explain prior decisions like Silverthorne Lumber, which had returned copies of documents illegally seized.
[143] However, even before Warden, the Supreme Court protected against the unauthorized copying of
material, similar to that involved in the Silverthorne Lumber.[144] Since Warden, the expansion of protection
of non-physical property has continued.[145] In Katz, the Court protected against electronic eavesdropping; it
could have held that a user's payment for a phone call gives him a property interest in the call.[146]
{66} In addition to being unnecessary, the shift in emphasis in Fourth Amendment analysis from property

law to privacy undermined the privacy interests that Justice Brennan, the author of Warden v. Hayden,
seemed to wish to promote. The undermining arose from the difficulty in defining limits on privacy. No one
wanted to protect every expectation of privacy-as the Court pointed out, this would provide constitutional
protection for the burglar justifiably thinking that his presence in a house would go undiscovered.[147]
{67} To delimit the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy, the Court in Rakas v. Illinois began to confine
rights of privacy to those whose expectations of privacy society considered "reasonable." Under Rakas and
more recent cases following it, "[a] subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is 'one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable.'"[148]
{68} However, this made the privacy test circular. How are we to determine that the expectation is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'"?[149] As the Rakas Court recognized, "[I]t would, of course,
be tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend
primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases."[150] To avoid this problem, the Court
concluded, "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society."[151]
{69} Despite this recognition in the Rakas opinion of the need to avoid tautology, the Court has generally
ignored or rejected non-criminal-law sources of an expectation of privacy. The language from the opinion has
been used only in United States v. Jacobsen, and even in that case, the Court upheld the search.[152] In
Jacobsen, the Court wrote that "the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about noncontraband items,"
so that the search was justified.[153] By basing the permissibility of the search on its criminal law
consequences, the Court made it more likely that privacy rights would arise only in criminal cases. The
Court's restriction of civil claims based on improper searches also reduces the likelihood that a privacy claim
would be heard in a non-criminal context.[154]
{70} More recently, the Court has rejected the idea that "concepts of privacy under the laws of each State are
to determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment."[155] Thus, even state law recognition of a right to privacy
will not make those expectations of privacy reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.[156] The
Supreme Court and state courts frequently differ on what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.
[157]
{71} By defining rights of privacy almost exclusively with reference to criminal cases, the Supreme Court
has insured that privacy will almost always be pitted against the interest in convicting a criminal. Tying
criminal rights to property rights created a general interest in protecting criminals because of the general
interest in protecting property rights. Tying criminal rights to property rights also allowed for the expansion
of rights against the government as new forms of property arose. Tying criminal rights to a circular test based
on "reasonable expectations" that would only be applied in criminal cases served neither of these purposes.
Instead, this circularity allowed the Fourth Amendment to be adjusted to the advantage of those in the legal
system best able to protect themselves. The very uncertainty of the meaning of the word "privacy" promoted
this process.[158] As a result, in several instances a common law expectation of privacy exists because a
business interest is involved, but the corresponding interest in privacy under the Fourth Amendment is held to
be unreasonable.[159]

IV. Conclusion
{72} Cryptography may provide a technical fix for Supreme Court decisions allowing the invasion of one's
private papers. However, the effectiveness of that fix will depend on whether the Court holds that use
immunity from the compulsory production of a cryptographic key extends to the incriminating documents

decrypted with the key. Logic suggests that the Court should so hold.
{73} However, the Court's inconsistencies in this area suggest the limits of logic. The Court has consistently
reconstructed Fourth and Fifth Amendment precedents to move away from historical practice. This
reconstruction is in part responsible for the Court's inconsistencies.
{74} A more sound approach would be to adhere to the usual practice of viewing the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments as adopting the practices of the framers at the time of the framing. This would revive broad
protection for merely evidentiary materials. Moreover, it would allow constitutional protections to evolve
along with social needs, as reflected in society's changing definition of property.
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